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When does the state listen?
Communication between the state and 
citizens is an essential element for an equal 
and just society. Growing social inequalities, 
lack of proper public services, and denial of 
basic human rights all act to widen existing 
communication gaps. Key to bridging these 
gaps is ensuring not only that citizen voices are 
heard, but also that states have the capacity 
and incentive to listen and respond. As much 
of the literature on accountability focuses on 
citizen voices, a group of researchers from 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania 
– in collaboration with the Institute of 
Development Studies – decided to look at 
state responsiveness. Trying to find instances 
of accountable governance, when the state 
is responsive to citizen voice, this team of 
researchers interviewed key actors across the 
state–citizen spectrum who had been involved 
in landmark social justice policy processes 
during major junctures of democratisation in 
these four countries. Calling their research 
project When Does the State Listen? (Loureiro 
et al. 2016), they examined when and how the 
state listened, and to which actors; and why, at 
times, it chose not to listen. 
The researchers identified three types of 
juncture when the state listened: (1) ‘hearing’ 
moments, when the state engaged with 
citizen voices but did not change the way 
it acted; (2) ‘consultation’ moments, when 
it engaged with citizen voices through two-
way dialogue, resulting in one-sided action; 
and (3) ‘concertation’ moments, when 
coalitions between reform-minded officials 
and politicians and organised citizen voices 
engaged in two-way dialogue and action for 
accountable governance. They witnessed 
concertation moments when state and 
non-state actors shared a sense of urgency 
and a common goal, despite different 
understandings of accountable governance. 
But they also found that states often reverted 
to consulting or hearing, as concertation 
moments are arduous and temporary, and 
part of larger, ever-changing policy processes.
In this brief, Lucas Katera looks at the 
barriers Tanzanian citizens and other non-
state actors face in trying to make the state 
listen to their voices. He focused his research 
on the design and implementation of primary 
education policies and programmes in 
Tanzania since the beginning of multiparty 
democracy in 1995. He analysed the content 
of various publications on primary education 
policies, looking for the voices of non-
state actors in government publications. 
He complemented this by interviewing key 
individuals, including government officials 
in the education sector, retired government 
officials who were in office during the design 
and implementation of post-1995 policies 
and programmes, as well as researchers and 
civil society actors working in the education 
sector. The research concludes that policy-
making is a top-down affair in Tanzania, 
where there is an antagonistic relationship 
between state and non-state actors. Despite 
Despite acknowledging, of late, the importance of non-state 
actors in guiding government education policies, the 
government often thinks of competition instead of 
cooperation when it interacts with non-state actors.
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acknowledging, of late, the importance of 
non-state actors in guiding government 
education policies, the government often 
thinks of competition instead of cooperation 
when it interacts with non-state actors. 
Whereas part of this mistrust comes from 
a sensitive state, non-state actors at times 
do not help the situation with critical and 
confrontational advocacy efforts.
Trends in the development of 
Tanzania’s education sector
Universal access to education has been 
on Tanzania’s development agenda since 
independence in 1961, when the government 
of the new state declared war on three social 
enemies: poverty, ignorance and disease 
(Nyerere 1968). Universal access to education 
was one way of addressing ignorance. 
Investment in education infrastructure was 
emphasised, alongside teacher training. By 
the end of the 1970s, Tanzania had almost 
attained universal primary education (UPE) 
through an effort that involved allocating a 
serious proportion of its national budget to 
education, increasing the number of schools 
and teachers, and making primary schooling 
compulsory and free.
But the government could not afford to 
sustain this effort and, under pressure from 
international financial institutions, from 
the early 1980s it decreased the overall 
percentage of gross domestic product 
allocated to education, shifted its educational 
policy towards cost-sharing, and introduced 
enrolment fees (URT 1993). Against the 
backdrop of the stagnation of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and following the 1995 multiparty 
elections, the state started once again to 
invest in primary education. Particularly over 
the past 15 years, budget allocation to the 
sector has been high, averaging 18% of total 
government expenditure.
Enrolment trends have followed changes in 
government funding, which have been shaped 
by different policies and programmes. For 
instance, enrolment in primary education 
increased slowly from 0.5 million children at 
independence in 1961 to 1 million children 
in 1973. Thereafter it increased sharply 
to a peak of 3.5 million in 1983. These 
developments could not be sustained 
following the economic crisis of the mid-
1980s, which necessitated cost-sharing and 
cuts in expenditure, leading to an increasingly 
uncomfortable learning environment and high 
dropout rates, especially among low-income 
families and other vulnerable groups like 
orphans. Enrolment fell to 3.1 million in 1988 
and started to rise slowly until 2000, when 
it reached 4.4 million. From 2001, enrolment 
increased sharply to a peak of 8.3 million in 
2007, after which it stabilised, before falling 
again in recent years. Figure 1 (on page 5) 
summarises primary school total enrolment 
since independence. 
These trends have been shaped by the 
government’s education policies and 
programmes. For instance, the sharp increase 
in enrolments in the mid-1970s occurred during 
the period when UPE was being vigorously 
implemented, and when education was generally 
regarded as a gateway to social mobility 
(Carnoy and Samoff 1990). Accordingly, 
enormous effort was made to transform an 
insignificant educational sector characterised 
by low enrolment rates and poor infrastructure 
into a national provider of UPE. The goal was 
to make free primary education available and 
compulsory for all members of society.
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Similarly, the sharp increase in enrolments 
from 2001 to 2007 was due to the 
implementation of the Education and Training 
Policy (ETP) of 1995 through the Primary 
Education Development Plan (PEDP), which 
started in 2002. This education policy 
came about as a response to the declining 
enrolment of the mid-1980s. Recently, the 
government has launched a new education 
and training policy, the 2014 ETP, aimed at 
addressing the weaknesses of the previous 
policy but also responding to the current 
national and global development agenda 
(URT 2014). The success of these policies 
and programmes depends heavily on how 
citizens understand them, but also on their 
involvement in policy formulation. 
Does the government listen 
to its citizens in policy 
formulation?
Citizen involvement in decision-making has 
been part of Tanzania’s political reforms 
in recent years. The local government 
reforms of the late 1990s emphasised the 
decentralisation of decision-making and 
policy formulation, especially on issues that 
affect citizens’ daily lives. To operationalise 
this, various structures exist at the lower 
levels of government to enable citizens to 
engage in decision-making (URT 1998). 
For sustainability and ownership of a project 
or programme, it is important to involve 
key stakeholders from situation analysis, 
through needs assessment and priority 
setting, to the drafting of the document (Tam 
Cho and Rudolph 2008). To what extent has 
the government involved its citizens in the 
formulation of policies and programmes 
in the education sector? To answer this 
question, we focus on the ETPs of 1995 
and 2014, and the 2002 PEDP. The 1995 
and 2014 ETPs were important in broadly 
shaping the education sector, with the 
1995 ETP aimed in particular at increasing 
enrolment of children, particularly those from 
poor and vulnerable families who had been 
out of school following the introduction of 
cost-sharing in the late 1980s. The PEDP was 
the key tool for operationalising the 1995 
ETP. Table 1 summarises the participation of 
non-state actors in each policy.
Figure 1. Primary education total enrolment in Tanzania since independence
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Table 1. Participation of non-state actors in Tanzanian education policy, 1995–2014
1995 Education and 
Training Policy
2002 Primary Education 
Development Plan
2014 Education and Training 
Policy
Think tanks
University 
experts and 
research 
institutions
Key message
The quality of the 
education system has 
suffered; poor children 
are excluded
Involvement
Participated in drafting 
the policy
Key message
Education programmes 
need to be informed by 
research
Involvement
Various studies provided 
input to the government 
actors drafting the policy
Key message
While we have achieved on 
quantity, more needs to be done 
about quality
Involvement
Invited to comment at later stages, 
but few sent inputs as the policy 
had already been launched 
Published research on the 
state of education to stimulate 
activists towards pressuring the 
government
NGOs
National and 
international
Key message
Children from poor 
families are excluded 
from access to education
Involvement
Did not participate in the 
policy process, which 
was under the control of 
the central government
Research and advocacy 
on the existing condition 
of the education sector
Key message
Children from poor 
families are excluded 
from access to education
Involvement
Some participation 
in education-sector 
working groups, but the 
government was selective 
on which inputs it chose 
to take into account
Advocacy and activism on 
the existing condition of 
the education sector
Key message
The quality of education has 
deteriorated
Involvement
Participated in formulation, but 
concerns not reflected in the 
final document
Roadside poster campaign 
and sponsorship of radio and 
television programmes on the 
state of education
Donors Not involved officially Key message
Cost-sharing did not have 
a human face
Involvement
Participated in various 
working groups
Key message
The quality of education has 
deteriorated
Involvement
Supported various groups, 
providing inputs to policy
Provided financial support to 
government for the preparation 
of the new policy, and to NGOs 
to stimulate debate towards 
improving policy
Media
Radio, print, 
television
Not involved (at 
this time, the media 
consisted of state-owned 
newspapers and radio, 
which reported progress 
without questioning 
implementation)
Key message
Children from poor 
families are excluded 
from access to education
Involvement
Various developments 
and challenges reported 
Key message
The public should be informed 
on debates about the policy
Involvement
Reporting on the state of 
education sourced from 
research publications and 
meetings
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The 1995 Education and Training Policy 
The starting point for establishing this policy 
was the Education Commission report under 
Jackson Makweta, popularly known as the 
Makweta Commission (URT 1993). This report 
contained a lot of detailed information on the 
problems of the education sector and what was 
needed to improve it. The Makweta Commission 
was formed following well-documented, 
high levels of citizen dissatisfaction with the 
direction of the education sector from late 
1980s to the early 1990s.
Knutsson (2005) noted that this dissatisfaction 
was mainly due to three factors. First was the 
high costs of education under cost-sharing. 
Second was the low quality of education, 
the result of a bad learning environment 
brought about by the lack of funding during 
the crisis of the mid-1980s. This resulted in no 
recruitment of new teachers despite increased 
pupil numbers, and little or no rehabilitation 
of schools or related infrastructure. Third, 
although cost-sharing was intended to 
make more money available in schools for 
infrastructure rehabilitation and the purchase 
of school supplies, the money it generated 
was treated by district administrators like 
any other tax, and hence spent at the district 
level rather than at the school level. It was also 
expected that cost-sharing would increase a 
sense of ownership in schools, something which 
never happened, since parents’ contributions 
were spent at the district level. Because of this 
widespread citizen dissatisfaction, local and 
international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) conducted research and advocacy, 
and lobbied the government and the donor 
community to reverse cost-sharing and 
thence the poor quality of education.
The 1995 ETP was established to address 
these challenges. The various stakeholders 
interviewed for this research to determine 
their involvement in formulating the 1995 
ETP – including civil servants (both retired 
and currently in power), researchers, 
academics, and civil society actors dealing 
with education – all concurred that the 
policy was centrally formulated. This may 
have happened because of the prevailing 
situation at the time, in which the central 
government – dominated by a single party 
– was the key player in determining policies 
for social service delivery, even though 
implementation was to be carried out at 
the local level. This tendency affected the 
education sector, just as it did other social 
services. Studies (e.g. Therkildsen 2000) 
show that despite the reform efforts of 
the mid-1980s, local government councils 
remained marginalised in decision-making 
on primary education, and parents had 
limited influence on collective decision-
making. Although the 1995 ETP was planned 
at the central level through the Ministry of 
Education, it intended to increase citizen 
participation in key decision-making during 
implementation.
It is also important to recognise that, while 
the 1995 ETP was centrally planned, it was 
also a response to international outcry about 
the exclusion from education of children 
from poor families because of the economic 
hardship.1 Academics, particularly from 
the University of Dar es Salaam, were key 
actors in the formulation of this policy, but 
civil society actors and citizens were not 
participants; neither were they proactive in 
trying to become involved. 
1 Much of the genesis of the ETP was the result of the National Task Force on Developing Education for 
the 21st Century, which was mainly externally driven as international concerns grew about large 
numbers of out-of-school children in developing countries (Sumra and Katabaro 2014).
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Given the nature of the formulation of this 
policy, there were mixed feelings on its 
perceived impact on the education system. 
Government officials, including those who have 
retired as senior officials in the sector, noted 
that the policy recognised the importance of 
local experts from academic institutions, and 
was a result of a clear understanding of the 
problems facing the sector, showing where the 
sector was, where it should be going, and what 
was needed to take it in the planned direction. 
According to retired civil servants, the policy 
was very coherent and clearly reflected the 
needs of the education sector. The problem, 
in their view, was one of implementation, 
because of limited funding.
On the other hand, interviews with civil 
society organisations2 (CSOs) revealed 
different opinions on the utility of the policy 
for improving the education sector. According 
to them, the fact that the government did not 
involve citizens and other education-sector 
stakeholders resulted in a policy which could 
not take the education sector forward. One 
of the ETP’s weaknesses was the assumption 
that it would result in an education system 
in which a child would move from a pre-
primary school all the way through to a 
higher-learning institution (HakiElimu 2008). 
In other words, the policy tried to orient 
citizens’ mindsets to an understanding that 
education meant passing examinations for 
the purpose of moving on to the higher 
stages of education (URT 2014), a belief 
that ignored the fact that children may 
have talents which could enable them to 
improve their lives before reaching an 
institution of higher learning. According to 
a HakiElimu survey in 2007, less than 20 
per cent of Tanzanians associated education 
with capability or the changes that a child 
acquires after the learning process. 
The second weakness identified by CSO 
interviewees was that, as a result of 
limited involvement of stakeholders in 
its implementation, the practice of using 
Kiswahili in primary schools for the majority 
of children, and English at secondary and 
higher levels created quality problems at 
higher levels and affected performance. 
From the students’ perspective, all the 
terminologies they learned and used for 
seven years of primary education in Kiswahili 
were of no use to them in secondary school, 
where everything had to be re-learned in 
English. Roy-Campbell and Qorro (1997) 
report on a study which found that an essay 
Citizen involvement in decision-making has been 
part of Tanzania’s political reforms in recent years. 
To operationalise this, various structures exist at 
the lower levels of government to enable citizens to 
engage in decision-making.
2 These include HakiElimu, Twaweza, the Child Dignity Forum and the Tanzania Education Network 
(TEN/MET) Secretariat. The TEN/MET is a national network of over 170 national NGOs, community-based 
organisations, international NGOs and district networks that are concerned with the promotion of education. 
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exam in Kiswahili yielded thoughtful and 
concise responses, but the same exam 
in English yielded disjointed and nearly 
unintelligible responses. 
These complaints from CSOs make it clear 
that that the government did not involve them 
in formulating the 1995 ETP. It is possible 
that the marginalisation of CSOs, local 
government and parents happened because 
discussions and consultations to formulate 
this policy took place when the country was 
still under centralised single-party rule, but 
also because pressure from civil society was 
not as strong as it subsequently became 
under multiparty rule.
The 2002 Primary Education 
Development Plan 
The PEDP started in January 2002 and ran 
for five years, up until the end of 2006. It 
was perhaps the most ambitious attempt, 
after the UPE drive in 1977, to influence 
primary education in Tanzania. The PEDP went 
beyond the aim of UPE, which was primarily 
concentrated on expanding access, and was 
more comprehensive in its scope. In addition to 
addressing access, it included an emphasis on 
improving the quality of teaching and learning, 
increasing the funding available at the school 
level, and making institutional arrangements 
more democratic and transparent throughout 
the system (URT 2001).
Reports indicated that the government 
decision to abolish school fees and mandatory 
contributions significantly increased enrolment 
(Sumra 2003; Davidson 2004). The abolition 
of these contributions was a result of advocacy 
and lobbying by both local and international 
NGOs, directed at both the government and 
international donors. Through the PEDP, 
more money from both the government and 
development partners was directed to the 
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A sign outside a school in Dar es Salaam.
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education sector. Classroom construction 
was undertaken, and teacher recruitment and 
deployment took place in all districts of the 
country. Communities clearly desired education 
and responded positively by registering 
children and taking part in construction 
activities. NGOs were more engaged in the 
PEDP process than they had been in the 
1995 ETP, and donors appeared to be willing 
to increase levels of support to primary 
education (Sumra 2003). These aspects 
provided grounds for optimism, and the 
government deserves to be commended for its 
determination to revitalise primary education.
However, other aspects of PEDP implementation 
– such as devolving power and resources 
to the community level, the role of school 
committees, access to necessary information 
on the lower-level PEDP, and meeting 
required funding thresholds – appeared 
to be fraught with difficulties, delays and 
confusion (Makongo 2003; REPOA 2004). 
Some of these problems were inevitable start-
up difficulties, but others could have been 
foreseen and avoided through better planning 
and management, and especially through 
more meaningful involvement of communities 
(HakiElimu 2008).
Studies show that objectives of the PEDP 
were not well understood, especially at the 
community level. Many people did not know 
what the PEDP was, or what it was trying 
to achieve (MOEC 2003). This is because 
citizens did not take part in its establishment, 
even though they were some of those most 
affected by its implementation. The Ministry 
for Local Government was to play a proactive 
role in involving citizens, but lagged behind. 
Stakeholder interviews suggest that the reason 
for this was a power struggle: the Ministry 
for Local Government thought that as the 
implementing ministry, it should have housed 
the programme, rather than the Ministry of 
Education, which mainly deals with policy. 
This lack of citizen awareness of the PEDP 
resulted in numerous implementation 
challenges, because the nature of the 
plan meant that implementation required 
a significant involvement by lower-level 
government, citizens and school committees. 
The construction of classrooms and other 
school facilities was a major undertaking 
of the plan, with the aim of creating more 
space to accommodate the many pupils who 
had dropped out. A key component of this 
construction was that government efforts 
would be complemented by citizens. A lack of 
awareness on the side of citizens on how they 
were supposed to engage in implementing 
the PEDP created a loophole for politicians to 
interfere with the operation of the plan for the 
purpose of gaining political popularity.
Many citizens were often opposed to making 
contributions of the kind demanded by the 
PEDP, especially when they were aware 
that the government had enough money to 
cover development projects. Tax payment 
is considered as a contractual agreement 
between the government and citizens, in 
which the latter pay tax in return for service 
delivery from the former. Obviously, tax 
payment may not necessarily be sufficient 
for full payment for the required services, 
in which case citizens may be requested 
to pay. This requires, however, discussions 
and agreements between a government and 
citizens. Since citizens were not well-consulted 
in the formulation of the PEDP, politicians 
wrongly informed them that the government 
had enough funding for the construction of 
infrastructure, implying that any additional 
contribution would very likely be misused by 
 RESEARCH 
BRIEFING
11
16
Why is it so hard for non-state actors to be heard?
Inside Tanzania’s education policies
government officials implementing the PEDP. 
It was easy for politicians to convince citizens 
not to contribute, because the citizens were 
implementing agents rather than part of 
programme planning; had they participated in 
planning, they would have better understood 
their roles, and this would have prevented 
the politicians distorting the initial plan for 
implementation.
The 2014 Education and Training Policy
The 2014 ETP was the result of the 
government’s recognition that some elements 
of the 1995 ETP had become outdated, 
but also a response to the cry of education 
stakeholders that a new policy was needed. 
The 1995 ETP was in place before other 
reform programmes in many sectors, so its 
implementation had to take place while these 
were getting off the ground, leading to a 
number of challenges. Some requirements of 
other national macro and micro policies were 
not appropriately addressed in the policy, 
and neither were some of the commitments 
Tanzania made as signatory to various 
international agreements. Furthermore, 
all the sectoral programmes were running 
concurrently, each claiming part of the 
meagre resources available in the country. 
Although improving the quality of education 
was a driving force behind the 1995 ETP, 
this proved difficult to achieve. Research 
pointed to the quality of education going 
down, suggesting to some a need to change 
the whole education system, including the 
curriculum, teacher incentives, teaching 
language and similar issues (HakiElimu 
2008). It also showed that while some 
achievements were recorded following the 
PEDP initiative, there were still high levels 
of regional and gender disparity (Missokia 
and Zombwe 2011). These trends led 
education stakeholders, especially in civil 
society, to call for a new policy to replace 
the 1995 ETP. It was very common in various 
policy discussions to hear comments from 
civil society demanding a new direction 
in education. It was also common to see 
posters and television programmes showing 
children at school congested in a classroom 
or fighting to access a common facility like 
a toilet. All these were messages to the 
government from civil society to change 
direction on education.
Eventually, in 2006, the government initiated 
a process of establishing a new education 
policy, but the process halted in 2008. 
During this period, education stakeholders 
– especially CSOs – were consulted by the 
government, and called to meetings to provide 
inputs to the planned new ETP. As one CSO 
key informant noted:
“As members of civil society working 
in the education sector, we were called 
[to] Morogoro in 2008 to provide inputs 
to the planned education and training 
policy. Although the document was 
already in place, we included our inputs 
with the expectation that the final 
document would reflect our thoughts. 
To our surprise, we saw the final report 
in 2014, which had not included most of 
our earlier concerns.”
After the consultations in 2008, the policy 
document that appeared in 2014 was 
presented as final, without returning to 
stakeholders to see whether their comments 
were reflected in the final document. 
Language of teaching, for example, was one 
key area of concern that was not reflected 
in the policy. Another was the removal of 
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cost-sharing, which was viewed by some 
CSOs as another attempt by the government 
to increase its popularity at the expense 
of quality of education. As one CSO key 
informant pointed out:
“Imagine that currently we have cost-
sharing, but still the financial resources 
available at school level are very small 
to meet the actual needs. What will be 
the case when parents completely stop 
complimenting such resources?”
For this informant, cost-sharing is necessary 
to increase the resources available at 
schools. Also important to consider is how 
cost-sharing is implemented, so that it 
does not become a serious burden to the 
very poor. A form of exception or reduced 
contribution could be a good option. But 
most important is that cost-sharing could 
be used to strengthen parental monitoring 
of schools, and accountability on the side 
of school administrations. But suggestions 
such as these from CSOs were not reflected 
in the 2014 ETP, as an educational researcher 
narrates:
“The current education policy is a 
result of [a] few government officials. 
Generally, unlike the previous 1995 
policy, this was not backed with clear 
research to determine the problem and 
establish clear solutions. The education 
policy of 1995 may have been good, 
only that it was partly implemented 
(perhaps only 50 per cent of the policy 
was implemented). We possibly needed 
to improve the previous policy instead 
of establishing a new one. Even the 
current one may be considered weak 
if it will have limited funding like the 
previous one.”
The final draft version of the 2014 ETP was 
discussed by politicians, mainly members 
of parliament. A ‘disguised’ consultation 
happened after the report had been launched 
by the President, when the Ministry of 
Education circulated the policy document 
to education stakeholders, including CSOs, 
academics and research institutions to 
provide feedback. It was not clear how the 
final policy document would incorporate 
comments from these stakeholders, given 
that it had already been launched.
Generally, the 2014 ETP was formulated with 
little or no involvement from key education 
stakeholders, a fact that the government 
appeared to admit while campaigning 
for the 2015 general election. During the 
campaign, free education from primary to 
lower secondary was one of the electoral 
promises of the presidential candidate from 
the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. 
But this was already provided for by the 2014 
ETP, implying that education would be free 
regardless of who was elected president. 
Knowing that citizens were not aware of this 
provision, the CCM used the provision of free 
education as a campaign promise. The CCM 
was re-elected, and many citizens still feel 
that free education is a result of their voting 
for the CCM, and that perhaps they would 
have been paying if they had voted for the 
opposition.
Just as was the case with the 1995 ETP 
and the PEDP, the lack of involvement of 
key stakeholders in the formulation of the 
2014 ETP means that a number of potential 
problems in its implementation are likely 
to occur. It should be noted that this policy 
has allowed the language of primary-level 
instruction to be both English and Kiswahili, 
and it is at the discretion of a school’s  
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management which language is used. 
Implementation of this will have a bearing 
on the National Examination Council of 
Tanzania (NECTA). There will be the need to 
start translating all primary books and exams 
translated into English, something for which 
the NECTA has limited capacity, and which is 
likely to be too much for it.
Why does the government 
ignore citizens’ views?
Discussions with both the government 
and CSOs working in the education sector 
suggest that the reason why the government 
seldom listens to its stakeholders is that the 
relationship between the two has been of 
‘pointing hands’ at each other, rather than 
working together as partners, identifying 
problems, undertaking research and coming 
up with solutions. Although CSOs follow 
this path, given their number and that of 
other researchers in the education sector, 
this results in a multitude of proposals 
requiring government attention within a 
short time period. It is too much for the 
government to take on board each and 
every issue proposed by CSOs. While the 
government may use this as an excuse 
for not responding to issues raised by 
education stakeholders, sometimes it may 
really be a challenge for the government to 
address everything. To meet this challenge, 
government officials say, it is important 
for CSOs to work with the government 
throughout the processes of situation 
analysis, needs assessment and priority 
setting. Once research priorities have been 
identified jointly between the government 
and civil society, the former will very likely 
own the findings and thus be more likely 
to use them. 
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Twelve-year-old Badria Ramadhani shares a Swahili language book with her classmates at Kibasila 
school in Dar es Salaam.
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In line with this, CSOs have been conducting 
research and disseminating findings in 
public before they are discussed with 
the government. The government as a 
key stakeholder in implementing findings 
needs to get results directly and discuss 
them, rather than seeing findings in the 
newspapers, some of which may not 
represent the actual situation in the sector. 
This only adds to the atmosphere of mutual 
accusation between the government and 
civil society. 
Finally, there are budgetary issues, which 
may constrain the government from 
taking proposals from the citizens. Some 
interventions require large sums of money 
that the government may not have at the 
time that citizens want action. It should also 
be noted that government processes have 
channels of approval before an action can 
be taken. Sometimes, these bureaucratic 
procedures take time, but this can be 
perceived as the government not responding 
to citizens’ views. 
Implications for policy and 
practice
This briefing investigates the extent to 
which the government has involved, or 
not involved, citizens and other education 
stakeholders in establishing policies. 
Involving citizens in policy formulation 
is very important, since they are the 
final beneficiaries and the key players in 
implementation of such policies. We found 
that the government rarely involves citizens 
in the formulation of education policies. 
The involvement of other stakeholders, 
especially CSOs, has also not been very 
effective. Although CSOs have been involved 
in the later stages of drafting policies, their 
comments have not been taken into account 
in establishing final documents. 
The major area of weakness is the existing 
relationship between the government and 
CSOs, which is not a partnership. The 
government views CSOs as institutions 
which are there to criticise government 
performance, regardless of how good it is. On 
the other hand, CSOs have been doing useful 
work, including studies which potentially 
could feed into government processes. 
However, such studies are done without 
consulting the government and departments, 
and thus sometimes end up using ambiguous 
statistics. The lack of government involvement 
in various stages of study implementation 
goes up to the level of dissemination. As such, 
measures to bridge the basic relationship 
between the government and CSOs may 
be needed to improve the involvement of 
education stakeholders in policy formulation 
in the future.
The relationship between government and 
CSOs has been one of ‘pointing hands’ at each 
other, rather than working together as partners, 
identifying problems, undertaking research and 
coming up with solutions.
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